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et al.: Mandamus--State Agency Reimbursement
ABSTRACTS

bation is void if the defendant was not represented by counsel and
did not waive that right. State ex jel. Render v. Wood, 152 W.Va.
484, 165 S.E.2d 102 (1968). However, in West Virginia the court
has held in applying Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), that
revocation of probation of a defendant who was not represented by
counsel is valid if he was previously sentenced with counsel present.
State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S.E.2d 810 (W.Va. 1969). The
court in Shawyer did not make a determination as to whether the
circuit court had mistakenly voided the initial revocation of probation; it ruled that the decision to free the defendant was final and
irreversible by application of the principles of res judicata. The
court in Shawyer also rejected the state's contention that the second
revocation of probation was actually a continuation (seventeen
months later) of the first hearing which was held within the probationary period.
Mandamus-State Agency Reimbursement
The Attorney General, under authority of W. VA. CODE ch. 11,
art. 1, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1970), appointed assistant attorneys
general to aid the State Tax Commissioner. W. VA. CoDE ch. 11,
art. 1, § 1 (Michie Supp. 1970), and Budget Bill for 1969-70, item
17, account no. 240, require that the Attorney General be reimbused
for the use of legal counsel and secretarial help. Therefore, from
its appropriations the Tax Department remunerated the Attorney
General to the sum of $117,666.65 for those personnel appointed
from July, 1969, through February, 1970. However, the Attorney
General requested compensation of $131,538.15 and filed a writ of
mandamus to compel the Tax Commissioner to issue a requisition
upon the State Auditor for the $13,871.50 deficiency. Held, writ
denied. The Tax Commissioner is required only to reimburse the
Attorney General for those services "in an amount agreed upon by
the Attorney General and the proper authority of said spending unit."
Budget Bill for 1969-70, item 17, account no. 240. The Tax Department's expenditure schedule for its appropriations earmarked sufficient funds to compensate the Attorney General, but that did not
mean the Tax Commissioner had agreed upon an amount of reimbursement. To hold so would deny him the discretionary power of
determining the personnel needs and appropriation expenditures for
his department. Further, the petition for the writ did not allege
any agreement on the amount of remuneration to be made; thus
the Attorney General failed to show a clear legal right to the relief
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requested. A writ of mandamus cannot be granted unless the party
seeking it shows a clear legal right to the remedy. State ex rel. Browning v. Haden, 175 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1970).
No cases were found discussing a state official's duty to spend
his entire allocations, but the decision appears to be in accord with
the restrictions upon a writ of mandamus. Such a writ will lie to
compel one to exercise any discretion he is permitted, but not to
control the result of that exercise. Miller v. County Court of Tucker
County, 34 W. Va. 285, 12 S.E. 702 (1890). Futhermore, mandamus is the correct procedure to require payment of an order
approved by a public body; but it cannot be used to demand
remuneration of the original obligation. Town of Elizabeth v.
County Court of Wirt County, 128 W. Va. 34, 35 S.E.2d 601
(1945).
Mandamus-Eminent Domain
Pursuant to a highway improvement contract with the State
Road Commission, a construction company was engaged in excavating portions of a hillside for improvement to a state highway. During
the work, an abandoned mine tunnel was opened. Several hours
later, large volumes of water gushed from the tunnel, flooded a nearby town, and damaged realty belonging to petitioners. Petitioners
brought a mandamus suit to compel the State Road Commissioner
to institute an eminent domain proceeding to ascertain the damage.
Held; Writs awarded. When highway construction or improvement
results in property damage to non-residual, private property in
the absence of an actual taking, the State Road Commissioner
has a duty to institute eminent domain proceedings within a reasonable time to ascertain damages. Moreover, mandamus will lie to
compel the observance of this duty. State ex rel. Phoenix Insurance
Co. v. Ritchie, 175 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1970). The court stated
that W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 9, which provides that property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,
is not limited to residual property. The clear legal right which a
petitioner must show is not that he had been damaged, but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the issue of damages should
be resolved by a judge and jury. Possible negligence of the State
in causing the damage is not a bar to recovery in eminent domain
proceedings.
Judge Berry's dissent urged that the eminent domain proceeding
applied only to residual property and did not extend to negligent
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